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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The article aims to present the meaning of the share repurchase (also                     
referred as buy back or buy-back) programmes and to identify the reasons                       
announced and potential results of share repurchase made by firms listed on the 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) in Poland.  
The main hypothesis to be verified states that there are more reasons to re-
purchase shares than just a cash transfer to shareholders and there are different 
results than just diminish cash holding.  
The problem is significant enough for since share repurchase in the litera-
ture is deemed as a substitute for dividends and as another way for cash transfer 
to shareholders [Horbaczewska 2012; Pieloch 2012; Duraj 2008]. But the author 
strongly believes that share repurchase might be used, for example, as one of the 
tools conveying information about the company to the financial market. It means 
that share repurchasing possesses information content which stems from the 
reasons for shares repurchase and might be used to convey specific information 
to their shareholders. Another aspect of share repurchase is that companies buy 
back their shares to mitigate the conflicts of interest between the management 
and the shareholders. 
 
 
2. SHARE REPURCHASE PROGRAMS POPULARITY 
 
 
In recent years share repurchase programs have become an important finan-
cial management tool. E. F. Fama and K. R. French found that in the years 
1978–1999 the proportion of dividend payers fell from 66,5% to 20,8% [Fama 
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and French 2001: 3–43]. G. Grullon and R. Michaely found that expenditures on 
share repurchase programs (related to total earnings) increased from 4,8% in 
1980 to 41,8% in 2000. Consequently, share repurchases as a percentage of total 
dividends increased from 13,1% in 1980 to 113,1% in 2000 with the amount of 
200 billion dollars. Grullon and Michealey also found that the amount of share 
repurchase as a percentage of net profit increased from 4% to 31% and the num-
ber of companies repurchasing their shares increased from 31% in 1972 to 80% 
in 2000 [Grullon and Michaely 2002: 1649–1684]. In 1999 and 2000 industrial 
firms spent more money on share repurchases than on dividend payments. 
It means that for the first time in history, share repurchase programs have be-
come more popular than dividends. The number of US companies and the 
amount of money spent on dividend payment were reduced, while the number of 
companies and money spent on share repurchase increased [Fama and French 
2001; DeAngelo et al. 2004: 425; Hrdlicka 2006]. 
Due to the financial crisis, American companies diminished the amount of 
money spent on dividend and share repurchase. Yet, they did not stop paying. 
In 2007 money spent on share repurchases reached the amount of $170 bn, in 
2008 reduced to $80 bn, and in 2009 to $30 bn, but in 2010 they soared to 78 bn 
dollars [Demos 2011]. In 2012 American companies’ expenditures on share 
repurchase program reached the level of 274 billion dol. This amount is higher 
than the amount of money raised in IPO in 2012 [Linebaugh 2012]. 
Even in Poland, the popularity of share repurchases has been growing for 
a couple of years. It is important to mention that in 2004 in Poland there were 
amendments to Commercial Code and then share repurchase procedure was 
eased. The years 2008 and 2012 are crucial as the number of companies repur-
chasing their shares increased to more than 40. It is about 12.5% of companies 
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). There were also two other years 
when the number of companies repurchasing their shares was significant – these 
were 2009 and 2011 when the number of these companies increased to about 
than 30. It is also about 10,0% of all the companies listed on WSE. 
 
 
3. THEORIES OF SHARE REPURCHASE 
 
 
There are various theories in the literature that try to give rationale behind 
stock repurchase. The similarities between dividends and stock repurchases allow 
perceiving them as the two ways of payout policy (cash distribution to stockhol-
ders) and make it easier to apply the dividend theories to stock repurchases.  
At the most fundamental level, the dividend irrelevancy theory of Miller and 
Modigliani states that share repurchases and dividends are perfect substitutes 
(substitution hypothesis) for each other, provided that capital market is perfect 
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and complete and provided that the investment policy is determined [Miller and 
Modigliani 1961: 411–433]. By this assumption, firms pay residual cash to in-
vestors either through dividends or share repurchases without affecting the value 
of the firm. Miller and Modigliani [1961] prove the irrelevance of cash payout to 
firm value under perfect market assumptions. Relaxing the perfect market                            
assumptions to let managers be better informed, they suggest that payout policy 
can reveal unrecognized firm value.  
Another theory is clientele hypothesis; the authors were Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy [1980: 469–4825]. The theory was developed by Allen, Bernardo 
and Welch [2000: 2499–2536]. This hypothesis states that investors enjoy spe-
cific preferences and they buy shares of the company whose policy and the 
course of action they accept, and they sell shares when they feel dissatisfied with 
the company’s policy and performance. The clientele hypothesis is also ex-
plained by the differences in tax rates or heterogeneous tax status of sharehold-
ers. Marginal tax rates faced by investors might be dominant while deciding on 
share repurchase.  
Miller and Modigliani also suggests that when markets are incomplete, 
firms can convey information about future cash flows through changes in payout 
policy. The idea of share repurchase information content draws on information 
asymmetry and signaling hypothesis. The separation ownership and management 
creates asymmetry in the information gained by owners and managers. The 
manager knows more and has better and thorough knowledge on the company 
operating activities. It means that the manager possesses private information 
about the firm, the one not shared with the market. And this asymmetric infor-
mation has the impact on the investor decisions. Judging by decisions and                              
actions taken by managers, investors can react properly. This situation leads to 
conclusion that managersʼ decisions and actions have information content and 
might convey information (signal) to the investors. The theory of information 
content and signaling hypothesis was developed by Ross [1977: 23–40] 
and Battacharya [1979: 259–270]. But the best known models are those of 
Bhattacharya, Miller and Rock [1985: 1031–1051], and John and Williams 
[1985: 1053–1070].  
The signaling models suggest that firms adjust cash distribution level to sig-
nal their prospects. A rise in dividends or a declaration of a stock repurchase 
program typically signal that the firm will do better. If the company expects 
good future and expects to generate cash flow from future activities it is more 
prone to distribute cash. The signaling models suggest also that the managers 
might convey information on their own valuation of the firm [Ofer and Thakor 
1987: 365–394]. If there is, in managers’ opinion, disparity between firm’s in-
trinsic value and market valuation, the companies are more willing to repurchase 
their shares. But share repurchase is very costly signal and as a signal of good 
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news it must be costly, so that other companies can not easily copy, otherwise 
the signal is void. 
Another theory – agency theory was developed by M. C. Jensen and 
W. H. Meckling [1976: 305–360]. The main idea of this theory is that the agent 
(manager) and the principal (owner) have got different scope of duties and diffe-
rent interests. Agency theory suggests also that firms with free cash flows 
in excess of their investment opportunities are likely to spend them on value-
-destroying projects which reduce the firm’s value. Grossman and Hart [1980: 
42–64], Easterbrook [1984: 650–659], Jensen [1986: 323–329] argue that if 
shareholders can minimize the cash management controls, it will be much harder 
for management to engage in unmonitored spending. One way to take excess 
cash from the firm is to increase the level of payout (free cash flow hypothesis). 
In the presence of information asymmetry between investors and managers, 
Easterbrook and Jensen argue that managers are imperfect agents of investors 
and cash payout can mitigate agency conflicts [Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986]. 
 
 
4. REASONS FOR THE SHARE REPURCHASE AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
 
 
Share repurchases are deemed as a part of  the excessive amount of money 
of payout policy and, thus, are treated as a substitute for dividends. But sharing 
with stockholders is not the only reason for share repurchase. It seems that there 
are also other reasons for share repurchase. The managers repurchase shares for 
the following reasons both internal and external [Horbaczewska 2012; Hsieh and 
Wang 2009]: 
1) internal: 
a) transferring cash to shareholders, 
b) changing the capital structure, 
c) changing the ownership structure, 
2) external: 
a) stabilizing share prices, 
b) improving financial ratios. 
Transferring cash to shareholders by share repurchase diminishes the 
amount of cash in the company. It is consistent with the free cash flow hypothe-
sis and the agency theory. Diminishing the amount of cash mitigates potential 
over-investment. The lower level of cash encourages the management to make 
more effort while using money left in the company more effective. The decision 
to repurchase shares in order to transfer free cash to shareholders is the subse-
quent decision. The main decision is to decide how much money the company is 
able to transfer to the shareholders (and how much to investment in the company 
itself). And then, once the company is aware the amount of cash available to the 
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shareholders, it has to decide on the way of transferring the money; whether by 
paying out dividend or by repurchasing shares. It is consistent with the substitu-
tion hypothesis. Share repurchase diminishes the amount of shares and the level 
of equity. It means that capital structure (equity – debt relation) is also changed. 
This relation should be changed only when the company is able to gain positive 
effects of leverage.  
Share repurchase results also in changing ownership structure. When com-
pany announces share repurchase program, the dissatisfied investors might exer-
cise their right to leave, while the voting power of the remaining investors (satis-
fied and loyal) gains in strengthen. Such an action is only support for the clien-
tele hypothesis.  
Repurchasing shares in order to change the ownership structure might be al-
so used as a means of defense against hostile takeovers. But the price of share 
repurchased must be higher than offered by bidder. With large dispersion of 
shares and investors, after share repurchase, even investors holding small blocks 
of shares might have big impact on resolutions.  
Share repurchase might be also used while creating employee ownership. 
Shares might be repurchased from the market and distributed to managers and 
employees as a kind of incentive. It also proves the agency theory because when 
managers and employees are owners they are more motivated and encouraged to 
make efforts more effective in order to meet the companyʼs objects. 
Stabilizing share prices affects the market share prices and is the most con-
nected with information content and signaling hypothesis. The managers having 
a better knowledge on the company and taking decision on repurchasing shares 
send a specific signal. Repurchasing shares is a sign of managers being con-
vinced that the shares are undervalued and the market share price should be 
higher. It means that managers believe that the actual situation and future pro-
spects are good and satisfactory enough. The managers would not repurchase 
shares if they were not convinced of higher intrinsic value than the one of the 
market share prices. When getting a signal on shares undervaluation investors 
might become interested in buying these shares (because of their undervaluation 
and potential future higher profits per share). 
What is more, while repurchasing shares, the company diminishes the 
amount of listed shares. These two aspects (the signal of undervaluation and the 
diminished number of listed shares), even under constant demand, lead to an 
increase in the market share price. Another aspect is that repurchasing shares, 
the company transfers cash to shareholders. This in turn is also a signal that 
companyʼs financial prospect are not at risk. This is the way the managers want 
to show that company may expect good prospects and is able to gain necessary 
cash flow from future operations.  
Share repurchase diminishes the amount of listed shares and equity. 
It changes and improves market ratios such as ROE or EPS. As these ratios are 
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important for investors, their improvement means that potential investors would 
be eager to buy the company’s shares. These might lead to an increase in P/E 
ratio and, subsequently, to the rise in demand and share prices. 
Clearly, there are many reasons for share repurchase. But it is worthwhile 
noting that repurchasing shares in order, for example to change capital structure, 
might result in share prices rise. Managers might achieve various results at the 
same time while repurchasing shares. 
 
 
5. REPURCHASED SHARES ALLOCATION 
 
 
While discussing the theories and reasons it is important to mention the way 
the shares are used after being repurchased from shareholders. According to 
Polish Commercial Code there are different procedures of using repurchased 
shares which are the following: 
1) share repurchase resulting in redemption of repurchased shares or 
2) share repurchase conducted in order to further resale repurchased shares. 
Redemption of shares means that the number of shares issued and listed de-
creases. Redemption of shares brings to reduction of the ownersʼ authorized 
capital and equity. It means that the level of equity is lowered permanently.  
If the equity level is lowered, the equity – debt relation is also changed. 
Although the level of debt is not changed, the share of debt in capital increases 
as the level of equity diminishes. There is also change in total assets level and 
in their structure. Because companies buy their shares, they pay money, and 
the level and share of current assets is diminished. It leads to decrease in the 
level of liquidity.  
Repurchasing shares with their redemption results in diminishing the num-
ber of shares. While the demand is constant, the supply falls, and it helps to 
maintain or increase the price of shares. 
If the equity level and the number of shares is permanently lowered, the fi-
nancial ratios such as EPS (earning per share), ROE (return on equity) increases. 
It does not mean that the earnings are higher but the denominator (the number of 
shares, the level of equity) diminishes. The rise in the level of financial ratios is 
done automatically with redemption of shares.  
Repurchasing shares with their redemption allows to achieve all reasons men-
tioned above (transferring cash to shareholders, changing capital structure, chang-
ing ownership structure, stabilizing share prices and improving financial ratios). 
Repurchasing shares for further resale means that the number of issued 
shares does not change. But the number of listed shares diminishes. The level of 
equity is temporarily lowered as long as the company holds its own shares (until 
their resale). Also the relation debt-equity and structure of total assets is changed 
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temporarily. After shares resale, the companies regains the level and structure of 
their balances (assets and liabilities).  
Repurchasing shares for further resale allows reaching some (although not 
all) of the reasons mentioned above (transferring cash to shareholders, changing 
ownership structure, stabilizing share prices). 
The usage of repurchased shares (shares redemptions or their further resale) 
affect the effectiveness of the share repurchase programs. It is also the important 
factor influencing the extent the aims of share repurchase program are met. The 
allocation of repurchased shares leads to achieving different results. 
 
 
6. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH 
 
 
The research is focused on the announced reasons and expected results of 
share repurchase started by listed companies. The article analyses selected statis-
tical data of the listed companies that repurchased their shares from Polish stock 
exchange (Warsaw Stock Exchange). The table reports the number of companies 
that started share repurchase in subsequent years with the announced reason and 
allocation of share repurchase. The survey does not cover companies that only 
announced share repurchase not followed any action. Nor does it cover the com-
panies that continued repurchasing their shares either (companies are included 
into research once only).  
The survey covers the years 2005–2012. It is important to mention that in 
2004 in Poland there were amendments to Commercial Code and then share 
repurchase procedure was eased. The analysed period covers the years of both 
prosperity and crisis. 
The total number of companies that started repurchasing their shares                               
exceeded 200. It is almost half of the companies listed on WSE. The table indi-
cates that the number of companies repurchasing their shares is growing. The 
years 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012 are crucial as the number of companies repur-
chasing their shares increased to more than 30. It is about 10–12% of companies 
listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE).  
Under The Polish Commercial Code there is no requirement to indicate the 
reasons for repurchased share. It is more often than not that companies indicate 
no reason for share repurchase. About 70% of all companies that started share 
repurchase in the years 2005–2012 do not indicate any reason.  
Common reason for repurchasing shares is incentive program for managers 
and employees. About 14% of all companies repurchasing their shares indicate 
this reason. It is especially true for 2007, 2008 and 2011 – the years of economic 
slowdown. And repurchasing shares in order to transfer them among employees 
and managers is consistent with agency theory. 
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T a b l e  1 
 
Reasons for share repurchase indicated by Polish companies listed on WSE 
 
Year 
Number 
of compa-
nies that 
started 
share 
repurchase 
Share redemption Further resale 
None Many 
Total Cash distribution 
Undervalua-
tion Total 
Incentive 
system for 
employees 
Capital 
group 
restructu-
ring 
2005 22 19 3 4 3 2 1 0 0 
2006 14 10 0 0 3 1 2 0 1 
2007 11 9 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 
2008 40 28 0 4 10 4 1 2 0 
2009 30 13 0 3 9 6 1 4 4 
2010 17 6 0 1 3 1 2 1 7 
2011 33 8 0 1 10 7 2 3 12 
2012 45 17 0 6 13 3 5 4 11 
 
S o u r c e: first hand collected data from individual websites of listed companies. 
 
Another reason indicated quite often by Polish companies is restructu-
rization of their capital group (it refers to 8% companies repurchasing their 
shares). It is connected with mergers and acquisition. It mostly occurs when 
repurchased shares are used to pay for the acquired company. In some cases, it 
refers to the shares remained after the companies got merged.  
Only 9% of all companies indicated undervaluation as the reasons for the 
share repurchase. These companies stated that „current situation on the financial 
markets does not reflect the actual value of the company”. All of these compa-
nies were willing to repurchase their share using procedure that results in share 
redemption. Share redemption leads to diminishing the amount of shares and the 
level of equity permanently. Share redemption reflects that the company is able 
to meet almost all the targets mentioned above. It especially holds true in respect 
of changing capital structure, changing ownership structure, and improving fi-
nancial ratio (ROE, EPS). And what is more, with share redemption  the supplies 
of shares decreases and the stable demand leads to the rise in the share price. 
Only 3 companies (1,4% of all companies repurchasing their shares) admit-
ted that they repurchase their share in order to transfer cash to their shareholders.  
Under The Polish Commercial Code there is no requirement to indicate the 
allocation of repurchased share. Thus, it is only optional and good will when 
companies indicate the usage of share repurchase. But the majority of companies 
repurchasing their shares (more than half) indicate shares redemptions. About 
26% of all companies repurchasing their shares indicate their further resale. In 
recent years, it has been more often than not (30% of all companies that started 
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to repurchase their shares in 2012) that companies indicate no usage or many 
usages of repurchased shares. It suggests that they do not want to reveal what 
they intend to do with repurchased shares. In this manner the managers are given 
a wide leeway to take decision on allocation and usage of repurchased shares at 
their convenience. 
 
 
7. RESULTS 
 
 
The aim of the article was to identify the announced reasons and potential 
results for share repurchases. The research was carried out by analysing the 
announcements of companies repurchasing their shares on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange.  
On carrying out the research for the listed companies, I found that shares 
might be repurchased for many different reasons and not only to signal the 
excessive amounts of cash held in the corporation. Viewing the numbers it is 
possible to state that transferring cash is the least important reason for 
repurchasing shares. It is likely that the research was done in the years of 
financial crisis and the companies did not want to dispose the cash holding it as 
a reserve for potential worse times. 
It is also possible to conclude that managers are not willing to share with 
investors the reasons of share repurchase. It is possible to state that companies 
expect investors themselves assign reasons to share repurchase according to their 
knowledge. And usually share repurchase is deemed as action bringing good news.  
It is also possible to notice that the true reasons are known to management, 
strategic investors, but not to minority shareholders. Thus, share repurchase 
programs allow minority owners to give up investing in the company and allow 
strategic investors to strengthen their voting power. 
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The article aims to present the meaning of the share repurchase (also called as buy back 
or buy-back) programmes and to identify the reasons announced and potential results of share 
repurchase made by firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE) in Poland. The main 
hypothesis to be verified states that there are more reasons to repurchase shares than just cash 
transfer to shareholders and there are different results than just diminishing cash holding. 
The problem is significant enough because share repurchase in the literature is deemed as 
a substitute for dividends and as another way for cash transfer to shareholders 
On carrying out the research for the selected listed companies, I found that shares might be 
repurchased for many different reasons and not only to signal the excessive amounts of cash held 
in the corporation. Viewing by the numbers it is possible to state that transferring cash is the least 
important reason while repurchasing shares. 
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DEKLAROWANE PRZYCZYNY I PRZEWIDYWANE SKUTKI  
WYKUPÓW AKCJI WŁASNYCH SPÓŁEK NOTOWANYCH NA GPW 
 
 
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie znaczenia wykupów akcji własnych, identyfikacji  
deklarowanych przez spółkę przyczyn wykupów akcji oraz potencjalnych skutków wykupów akcji 
(z uwzględnieniem umorzenia odkupionych akcji lub dalszej ich odsprzedaży). W literaturze 
dominuje przekonanie, że spółki dokonują wykupów akcji głównie w celu przeznaczenia nadwyżek 
gotówki na rzecz właścicieli. Główną hipotezą poddaną weryfikacji było stwierdzenie, że spółki 
wykupując akcje realizują większy zakres celów niż tylko dystrybucja gotówki. Przedmiotem badań 
były spółki notowane ma Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w okresie 2005–2012.  
Wyniki badań przeprowadzonych na potrzeby niniejszego opracowania wskazują, że akcje 
rzeczywiście są wykupowane nie tylko w celu dystrybucji gotówki. Właściwie, ta przesłanka 
stanowi najrzadziej deklarowaną przyczynę wykupów akcji.  
 
 
 
